INTRODUCTION
The changes we face in the 21st century economy involve permanent economic revolution: continuous and rapid innovation that compels unprecedented flexibility and adaptability in skills and knowledge. Increasingly every good and every service will be exposed to relentless global competition. And to equip ourselves best to meet and master these challenges , we need a pro-enterprise, pro-opportunity Britain. 1 This article seeks to examine some of the various dimensions of the governance of corporate business in modern Britain. In order to do this it is proposed to sketch out an overview of New Labour"s approach to the subject as informed by its analysis of the  Department of Law, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT.
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wider political economy. It should be noted that the primary objective of the article is to map this political rhetoric on to contemporary debates in corporate law and governance and that space does not, therefore, permit an extensive critical analysis of the many contestable concepts involved therein. The importance of the current political interest in corporate law and governance should not be underestimated.
Whilst such interest is hardly novel, the communitarian approach of New Labour has the potential to transcend the Thatcherite neo-liberal dichotomy between the private world of the economic actor and the public world of the societal actor through the creation of new regulatory spaces and community-based discursive processes. It remains to be seen if such spaces or processes will emerge in actuality, as this will depend upon whether New Labour"s particular communitarian mix proceeds by dialogue or edict.
There is no shortage of primary source material in relation to United Kingdom company law as there is at present a great deal of interest in the subject in a large part due to the very extensive technical review of the area being undertaken currently by the Department of Trade and Industry. The aim of the review is to evaluate critically and holisitically the structural basis of U. K. company law that was laid down in the nineteenth century ( and which has only been revised incrementally during the present century ), so as to address explicitly the regulatory issues arising in the contemporary global economy, and thereby to provide a modern facilitative framework of company law that will be effective in promoting and sustaining an entrepreneurial economy.
The article will, in particular, draw upon the following crucial D.T.I. Consultation Documents that have been issued in the course of the review, namely : Modern P o s t -P r i n t ( March 1998 ) The principal substantive focus of the article will be on the Blair Government"s perception of the inherent conceptual tension between the need for the state to promote the entrepreneurial flair required in order for the nation to prosper in the global knowledge economy, and the need to find an effective means of regulating the actors in that marketplace. In order to examine this tension ( which, although to some extent oppositional, is nevertheless not a paradox ) it is necessary to consider the interface of morality with entrepreneurial culture. It will be argued that only by so doing can an appropriate balance between risk taking and fraudulent or immoral business failure be established. This interface thus provides the key to the maintenance of the integrity necessary for the market to function, thereby ensuring both its economic and wider societal legitimacy. The vital importance of cultural attitudes in attaining the optimum form of business governance for the welfare and prosperity of the nation, together with the magnitude of the task in hand and the need to involve all of the members of society in the debate, are clearly demonstrated by
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Stephen Byers in his speech at the London Business School ( 21 July 1999 ):
P o s t -P r i n t
Clearly shifting British culture onto a more enterprising and less riskaverse track will take time. But we must all aspire to change the national mood if we are to create an outward looking, confident society, fit to take on the 21st century.
However, as will be demonstrated, New Labour does not perceive itself as having a free hand to engineer the desired broad regulatory framework. For in the globalised economy "excessive" state regulation by traditional command and control techniques is rendered untenable, as inimicable and burdensome to the vital creative SME sector and due to the possibility of larger companies engaging in forum shopping by way of capital flight by to a more favourable regulatory regime. Given the constraints thus believed to be imposed by the processes of globalisation, at a high level of abstraction the creation of the new governance regime is said, therefore, to require nothing less than, "... a new coalition between Government, business and society." 4 At a more concrete level the political construction of a market morality depends upon a matrix of factors, one of the most important of which, since the legislative reforms of the Thatcher Government, is the structure of the insolvency regime. 5 In contrast to company law, which is generally permissive and enabling in nature, insolvency law is by its very nature rather more interventionist. Accordingly, the state"s interest and role in managing the orderly winding up and dissolution of companies is uncontentious. As such, the insolvency process provides an ideal mechanism for the state to undergird business values through the utilisation of the examples of bad practice thereby gleaned in order to illuminate desirable business behaviour. A model of this practice in operation ( which this article will focus upon by way of example ) is the Blair Government"s policy of naming and shaming rogue and phoenix company directors.
P o s t -P r i n t
Unfortunately, whilst such a governance mechanism is a potentially powerful weapon in the armoury of the modern regulatory state, it is in the present context a policy instrument that requires careful handling. Once more, this difficulty refers back to the pervasive interface of business practice with morality introduced above, as it is also the case that the Government places a high priority on encouraging entrepreneurs in order to boost Britain"s international competitiveness, and the stigma attaching to business failure is thought to be a powerful disincentive to such individuals. Indeed, such is the current weight that the Government attaches to the stigma arising from business failure, that the Insolvency Service has been instructed to undertake a review into this subject on behalf of the Department of Trade and Industry and a consultation paper is proposed for winter 1999.
It will be argued that the notion of the director as a "responsible risk taker" has gained substantial political and commercial currency ( although it should be acknowledged that the concept has yet to receive significant attention from the judiciary or legal profession ) as a way of balancing these opposing objectives, and that the concept also has the potential to unify certain otherwise disparate aspects of company law and insolvency law and public and private company governance.
In conclusion, it will be suggested that some form of value-based signalling in relation to the interface of business practice with morality, is essential to the establishment and continuing development and maintenance of company directors as "responsible risk takers". Further, it will be argued that this concept forms a vital element of the wider societal compact that is necessary to foster an entrepreneurial culture in which the full P o s t -P r i n t spectrum of companies, from the owner-managed private limited company to the public company with a full stock exchange listing, are perceived by society as having a legitimate "licence to operate". " It has been made evident to us that there is a widespread dissatisfaction at the ease with which a person trading through the medium of one or more companies with limited liability can allow such a company to become insolvent, form a new company, and then carry on trading much as before, leaving behind him a trail of unpaid creditors, and often repeating the process several times. The dissatisfaction is greatest where the director of an insolvent company has set up business again, using a similar name for the new company, and trades with assets purchased at a discount from the liquidator of the old company."
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It should be noted that this oft-quoted paragraph refers not only to the general notion of the phoenix abuse, but also to the more specific and aggravated practice of setting up a new company and trading in the same business with a name similar to that of the P o s t -P r i n t insolvent company. In such a circumstance the controllers of the phoenix company have not only sheltered themselves from the full ramifications of the first business failure by the use of a limited company, but they have also transferred the value of the goodwill attaching to the name of the original business to the new phoenix business thereby seeking to misrepresent the credit status of the new business in the eyes of its potential creditors. The complexity of the underlying policy issues is demonstrated by Parliament"s response to the Cork Committee"s recommendations, which was to make the use of a similar company name for the phoenix company a criminal offence pursuant to section 216 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and to leave the general phoenix scenario to fall within the factors to be taken into account by the courts in determining whether a director is unfit to act as such, thereby meriting disqualification under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
The case of J & L Ashworth ( Hardware ) Ltd 8 illustrates a typical use of publicity sanctions as part of the name and shame campaign. The decision is indicative of the wider usage of the phoenix term as the director had been found unfit to be a company director pursuant to section six of the Company Directors disqualification Act 1986 on the basis, inter alia, that he had 'caused three companies to commence trading in a business which had failed previously'. Although the companies were all undertaking the same type of business they were not utilising prohibited names, and section 216 of the Insolvency Act was thus irrelevant as the companies were not therefore phoenix companies in the technical sense. To add to the confusion it should be noted that even if a prohibited name had been used there is nevertheless an automatic exemption for the phoenix company directors from the operation of section 216 if full consideration P o s t -P r i n t is given for all the assets ( including any goodwill attaching to the company name ) transferred to the new company ! 9
From the above it can be seen that the phenomenon known as the phoenix company is not only a subject of much complexity, but is also is the subject of much contemporary interest and not simply within the relatively narrow confines of either the legal academy or insolvency practitioner circles. As a consequence of the well publicised name and shame campaign orchestrated by the Department of Trade and Industry the phoenix problem has also been the focus of considerable attention in the political and commercial spheres as part of the Government"s campaign to create a actively hostile business environment for rogue directors. 10 
GLOBALISATION, THE THIRD WAY AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
Such support for good market practice is unsurprising, as more generally the Government has given a high profile to the vital importance of commercial enterprise to the U.K., with particular reference to the need to be competitive and flexible in a post-Fordist global marketplace with its emphasis on just-in-time delivery; short production runs and product quality. 11 An elaboration of the policy consequences of post-Fordism forms a pervasive theme in the white paper issued by the Department of individualism and community, and it is always stressed that there is no inherent tension between the juxtaposed ideas but rather that they are strongly complementary.
Rather unsurprisingly, the theory underlying this type of articulation has been subject to vigorous critique, particularly by members of the more traditional Left of the political spectrum such as Stuart Hall, who comments somewhat disparagingly that, P o s t -P r i n t "The "Third Way" speaks as if there are no longer any conflicting interests which cannot be reconciled. It therefore envisages a "politics without adversaries". "
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In any event, the new ground that emerges ( or which may be thought to be in the process of emerging as the modernising project is explicitly described as one of "permanent revisionism" ) is of a society of opportunity and responsibility which draws upon, and is informed by, not only traditional socialist ideas of social obligation and solidarity but also the core Thatcherite motifs of economic opportunity and In particular, as part of a series of policy initiatives centred around "Competitiveness UK", the Blair Government has proved keen both to stress the key role that small and medium sized companies have to play in building an enterprising nation 33 and to undertake a comprehensive review of company law so as to provide a modern framework for a modern economy. 34 These two themes are of some importance in the phoenix company context for such companies are invariably small owner-managed enterprises. Hence, as the Government encourages the growth of this sector, 35 by seeking to foster a culture 36 in which many more individuals view it as natural to aspire to become risk-taking entrepreneurs, 37 the phoenix scenario has the potential to affect fundamentally a very large and growing number of people whether as victims or as perpetrators. 38 It is thus important that the governing legislative provisions should articulate a clear policy which is both accessible and intelligible to this constituency.
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Such transparency is of especial significance given the severity of the sanctions which apply to infractions of the complex statutory provisions relevant to the phoenix company and this is all the more the case if the Government chooses to maintain a policy of naming and shaming those responsible for such transgressions.
THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE BUSINESS : PUBLIC COMPANIES
The Labour Government"s early stress upon naming and shaming phoenix directors is indicative of the fact that the phoenix company problem squarely raises, in terms of both the appropriate regulatory mechanisms and the substantive standards to be employed, the wider issue of the governance of corporate business. Whilst there has been considerable interest in this topic in recent years, 41 the traditional focus in the United Kingdom has been towards a more circumscribed notion of corporate P o s t -P r i n t governance conceived primarily in terms of determining the appropriate relationship between the board of directors and the shareholders 42 of a relatively small number of quoted public limited companies. 43 Given the tremendous power that many of these companies command such a high level of interest is undoubtedly justified and even though this form of corporate governance ( being principally addressed at the accountability of publicly traded companies 44 ) is not directly relevant to the narrow phoenix company issue there are certain aspects of the debate which are illustrative of the current relationship between the state, business sector and wider community towards the governance of business in its broader sense.
In particular, it is acknowledged that the power of publicly traded companies arises not simply from the deficit in the level of accountability to their shareholders but because such companies are also in an increasingly autonomous position vis-à-vis the state due to the opportunities offered by information technology and open capital markets for global re-location. 45 In the light of the latter point it is unsurprising ( especially given the wider political scenario previously outlined ) that the corporate governance discourse has been conducted primarily in the realm of self-regulation in both the domestic 46 and the international sphere. 47 Thus, although there is general agreement that some state intervention is necessary to provide a basic regulatory framework to the market, 48 the broad thrust of the corporate governance proposals is towards the flexibility and dynamism of self-regulation and to an invocation of a neoliberal minimal state that will not place what are perceived as unnecessary hurdles in the way of wealth creation.
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At present it is widely acknowledged that the precise form and scope of the governance mechanisms of any system of self-regulation will need to map the specific culture of the host state 50 and it would seem that there is general acceptance ( at least in the UK business world ) of two core ideas central to the Anglo-American paradigm
: that a company"s primary mission is to generate returns for the present and future shareholders and that the shareholders" rights are derived squarely from their private property interest in a company. 51 It follows that in one sense the effect of adopting a system of self-regulation in the UK which acknowledges the investors and directors as the principal legitimate actors in the company ( thereby severely de-limiting the role of the state and other stakeholders in the formal governance process ) has been to privilege a "privatised" 52 view of the publicly traded company. 53 However, simultaneously and paradoxically, due not only to the employment of the twin principles of disclosure and accountability but due also to the desire to pre-empt state intervention, 54 another dimension arising from the use of self-regulation has been the placement of the governance debate firmly within the public sphere.
Clearly the adoption of a "pluralist model" as opposed to the present "enlightened shareholder value model" would formally create a focused arena of a distinctive legal nature for public discussion concerning the business practice of company directors. In very crude terms the privatised axis is at present thus constituted as the dominant formal mode of discourse and is thus privileged over the public limb of "inclusiveness" attaching to the notion of the "licence to operate" which, in a formal legal sense, languishes barely distinguishable within its shadow ( a fact which is undoubtedly exacerbated by the confusion within the enlightened shareholder model between short-termist and inclusive approaches ). 58 However, on this axis it is the preemptive principle of self-regulation which ironically has thrown certain substantive business operations open for debate in the civic arena, for it permits and necessitates a discourse concerning the business practice of going concern companies as a means of legitimating and sustaining their societal "licence to operate".
A prime example of this shift in the UK, which bears a close affinity to the name and shame campaign over rogue directors, is the ongoing public debate over levels of executive pay. 59 The topic of so-called "fat cat" salaries, in particular in relation to senior executives of privatised industries such as Cedric Brown, Chairman of British Gas plc, has been constantly in the press in the last decade. Such pressures led to self- 
THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE BUSINESS : PRIVATE COMPANIES
By way of contrast, the governance of private companies 61 is a subject which is rarely examined or even directly acknowledged as a field of enquiry in such terms. 62 Indeed, such companies have been traditionally placed for analytical purposes within a much more discrete frame of reference than listed public companies. This strongly private perspective is reinforced by a factual backdrop where there is rarely a separation of ownership and control as, unlike the majority of listed public companies, the ownermanagers of a private company will almost invariably own or control the majority, if not all, of the share capital and voting rights of the company. Thus, as the small private company is viewed as being distinctively within the private sphere 63 , the analytical perspective associated with it has largely disregarded any broader civic, ethical or socio-political analysis, at least in relation to the ongoing governance of a company"s business. Hence, the widely held view of corporate practitioners is that unanimous shareholder ratification is a near universal panacea at common law for any internal corporate irregularities ( of a civil nature ) arising in a solvent private company. The strong notion of shareholders as the utilisers of their own private P o s t -P r i n t property has undoubtedly been influential to this end, as one commentator has recently put it : "Ownership ... served to legitimate the corporate form itself. So long as it was owned by individuals the economic and political power of the company was both benign and a bulwark against the intrusion of the state."
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Clearly such sentiments were well fitted to the prevailing neo-liberal political and economic culture that characterised the majority of the Thatcherite era and in which the power of the state was in theory to be retrenched in order to allow maximum economic autonomy to individuals. 65 Accordingly, the extensive disquisition on the private limited company ( which itself was strongly associated with this entrepreneurial freedom ) in the last twenty years tends to have been conducted by way of a discussion of the appropriate facilitative structures to be adopted, in terms of de-regulation initiatives and by way of an otherwise relatively discrete and technical legalistic discourse. 66 It is not obvious that this position will change, for whilst the company law review does consider private company governance issues both in the context of the scope of company law and in its own right, the former is considered largely irrelevant ( within the context adopted ) and the latter is primarily conceived in structural and facilitative terms. Hence, although the judicial treatment of issues in respect of this facet of the governance of the private company sector has not traditionally been imbued with a strong prophylactic aspect at common law, it may be argued that such an approach is increasingly to be found, to (mis)use Maine"s famous phrase, "hidden in the interstices of procedure" ( or in more modern parlance the designated fields of regulation ) arising on business failure. 71 In fact this outcome is not too surprising given the Thatcher Government"s deliberate restructuring of the insolvency regime by licensing its operation to a new professional monopoly of insolvency practitioners and creating new punitive sanctions pursuant to the wrongful trading and disqualification P o s t -P r i n t regimes. Thus, it is undoubtedly the case that these major reforms were initiated in order both to police and to legitimate the market as a social ( rather than simply an economic ) institution. 
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It is submitted that the transparency generated by these twin policy initiatives would have the benefit of promoting both a more general awareness and a deeper understanding of the responsibilities of a contemporary company director within society and thereby of reducing existing levels of confusion or ignorance on the topic.
In addition, a public space would be created in which the appropriate governance principles for corporate business activities could be forged and elucidated. 77 As this task is central to the maintenance of the broad compact between companies, the multifarious corporate actors ( principally comprising of a company"s directors, employees, creditors and consumers ) and the wider society, which constitutes the corporate licence to operate there would seem to be no good reason why such a duty of skill and care should not also apply to the directors of publicly traded companies, We need to examine all our regulatory systems to ensure that they do not needlessly deter our entrepreneurs ... Are we sure that they create confidence in enterprise and commerce ? I don"t think we are confident. I think we need fundamentally to re-assess our attitude in Britain to business failure. Rather than condemning it and discouraging anyone from risking failure, we need to encourage entrepreneurs to take further risks in the future. 81 Such rhetoric has attracted a good deal of criticism due to its open-ended nature and at first blush certainly seems to run against the Department of Trade and Industry"s policy of naming and shaming rogue directors who have transgressed the bounds of acceptable commercial behaviour. 82 However, from subsequent events it is clear that the sentiments expressed are part of a considered policy initiative which expressly looks to future law reform to improve corporate rescue procedures and to reduce the stigma of financial failure. 83 The next Secretary of State at the Department of Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers M.P., has maintained the momentum whilst introducing a new character to replace Mr. Mandelson"s "serial entrepreneur" : the director as a "responsible risk taker". It is suggested that this construct offers a rich linguistic resource 84 which may be drawn upon to develop a nuanced view of the company director"s role and the pervasive interface with business practice and morality. Indeed, Stephen Byers has sought to do just this :
To foster a climate of responsible risk taking, we must also tackle head-on the stigma attached to business failure in this country. At present our bankruptcy laws make no distinction between the responsible risk taker and those individuals who deliberately set out to cheat their creditors or abuse the system. 85 Thus it is clear that for New Labour the notion of the company director as a responsible risk taker is central to the governance of business operations and to the maintenance of the corporate "licence to operate" in the emerging global knowledge economy of contemporary informational societies. 86 What remain unclear are the institutional structures and processes by which the concept of the responsible risk taker will be fleshed out.
GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE BUSINESS IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
Returning to the theme of private limited companies, it is indeed unsurprising that Government thinking should be orientated in the direction discussed above, as the dynamism of the SME sector and its ability to develop the positive aspects of risk 87 are frequently stated by New Labour to be central to the development of the knowledge economy necessary to compete in the global marketplace. Following the New Labour model it would seem that these twin pressures have brought about the need for economic restructuring so as to encourage small adaptive structures working in a bottom-up fashion in order to foster the necessary creativity and flexibility. 88 
P o s t -P r i n t
Such thinking has led the Future Unit of the Department of Trade and Industry to develop two scenarios ( which although not constituting an official statement of policy nevertheless will form a conscious aspect of Departmental decision making ) for the business world of the knowledge economy : "built to last" and "wired world". 89 The former scenario envisages the dominance of large corporations ( whose financial might will provide secure careers, good research and development facilities, structures to capture know-how and to exploit brands ), whilst the latter more favoured model ( picking up the current trend of business growth in the SME sector ) posits a constellation of trust based networks of SMEs. It is acknowledged that the reality is likely to be an amalgam of the two positions but it is important to note that such an eventuality has significant structural implications, as Castells has put it:
"Under the conditions of fast technological change, networks not firms, have become the actual operating unit. In other words, ... a new organizational form has emerged as characteristic of the informational global economy: the network enterprise. 90 In such circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that there is concern that the traditional means of corporate governance ( with their reliance upon the director/shareholder relationship within individual companies ) are proving inadequate and that there is a much greater emphasis upon governance by way of business culture, in terms both of directors" practice and the relationship between companies and society.
Concomitant upon the above, it is New Labour"s current view that the key to a Government"s success lies not in stakeholding, 91 at least in the monolithic and corporatist manner in which it is generally conceived, 92 but in the more institutionally flexible and politically malleable notion of partnership. As such the stakeholding idea, P o s t -P r i n t which was launched in Tony Blair"s Singapore speech ( 8 January 1996 ) as an organising principle of New Labour, has now been supplanted in this respect by the Third Way. Will Hutton gives a spirited defence of stakeholding against the charges set out above and defends the relevance of the concept : "stakeholding represents the political economy that New Labour lacks to support its value and vision of the "Third Way"." 93 However, whilst Hutton fervently believes that stakeholding constitutes, "the only current, practical way of pursuing progressive politics", he is forced to conclude regretfully that as, " [s] takeholding is one more expression of European social market capitalism; it will only succeed within an overall European framework constructed to defend the European model." 94 As an indigenous idea to the U.K.
stakeholding, therefore, seems dead. It seems unlikely that the company law review will mark an explicit re-vitalisation of the concept ( even if it is re-badged as the "pluralist model" and applied principally in relation to publicly traded companies ) in the U.K. corporate sphere.
By employing the new term "partnership", New Labour is not, of course, seeking to limit the meaning to the legal definition of the concept but rather to use the word in its wide generic sense. 95 Such partnerships are consciously promoted as a means of delivering goods or services that would be considered too interventionist and expensive for the retrenched modern state alone. 96 However, the reconfiguration of the relationship between the state, business and the wider community that is thereby entailed has had the effect of blurring the traditional boundaries between the public and the private domain, and thereby of public and private law. In particular, there is some concern that the private law of contract is not an adequate vehicle by which to ensure representation of the public interest or to determine accountability. 97 Further, this is a matter which especially resonates in corporate law where there is a long heritage of suspicion of the private power wielded by corporations and it would seem that the question of corporate legitimacy will again come to the fore as a consequence of the greater concentration of erstwhile public power in ostensibly private entities. 98 In addition, the broader governance problems raised by the multi-level interpenetrated formal and informal structures arising are notoriously difficult and complex. 99 Further, it would seem that, as public-private partnerships become more widespread, there is a real danger that some of the positive public service values of the traditional public sector will be eroded 100 ( or at the least disappear from sight, which may have a similar effect ). Rather disturbingly, when this factor is combined with a vigorous constellation of SMEs with a high sensitivity ( and doubtless antipathy ) to regulatory intervention, 101 the commercial environment becomes one in which there is a considerable risk of a governance vacuum.
In such a structural context it may be argued that there will be potentially a Whilst alternative political and regulatory models are available in relation to a more positive and less authoritarian use of name and shame sanctions , 107 it is clearly evident from the example provided by phoenix companies that the mapping of morality and business regulation is in any event by no means straightforward. 108 Nevertheless, in conclusion, it would seem that the responsible risk taker motif does offer a useful starting point for discussion, and that a rigid distinction between the economic, social and political realm is increasingly more untenable : it will be interesting to see how the debate evolves. businesses were stated to be " ... at the heart of job creation and the Government"s drive to promote competitiveness" and the "think small first" principle ( enunciated in The Strategic Framework Document, para. 2.25 ) by which companies legislation would be made "SME-centric" was roundly endorsed. 34 The framework of the review and its terms of reference are set out in Modern Company Law. See further, The Strategic Framework Document which identifies the needs of small and closely held companies as a key issue within the review ( see para. 2.19 and ch. 5.2 ) and indicates that the phoenix company issue will be pursued in depth in the next phase ( see para. 5.2.12 ). 35 The latest business statistics indicate that at the beginning of 1998 there were 3.7 million active P o s t -P r i n t 63 Whilst this characterisation may be said to be true of company law as a whole it is often argued that corporate law has a strong public law character ( particularly in relation to public companies ), see e.g. P o s t -P r i n t
